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THEY’RE PEOPLE TOO:
WHY U.S. COURTS SHOULD GIVE FOREIGN
AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT (FSIA)
INTRODUCTION
We live in a globalized world interconnected by technology and in-
novation.1  International trade has become the standard, not the ex-
ception.2  Further, transnational litigation has continued to grow, and
foreign litigants have flocked to the United States.3  There is little to
no distinction between public and private corporations; more times
than not, they conduct their business in the same manner.4  Where
there are two parties, one a private corporation and the other a state-
1. See Dan A. Naranjo, It’s a Small World After All: Why It Is So Important for Texans to
Understand the International Court of Justice, 77 TEX. BUS. L.J. 322, 322 (2014).
2. See id.  In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S. A. v. Hall, a case concerning a Colum-
bian company doing business in the United States, Justice Brennan in his dissent, noted
The vast expansion of our national economy during the past several decades has pro-
vided the primary rationale for expanding the permissible reach of a State’s jurisdiction
under the Due Process Clause . . . . [I]t has become both necessary, and . . . desirable to
allow the States more leeway in bringing the activities of these nonresident corpora-
tions within the scope of their respective jurisdictions.
466 U.S. 408, 410, 422 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Michael Joachim Bonnell, Do We
Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 87, 87–88 (2001) (discussing the imple-
mentation of international codes and statutes in the last two decades such as the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods).
3. Recent Case, Civil Procedure – Personal Jurisdiction – D.C. Circuit Dismisses Suit Against
National Port Authority of Liberia for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction – GSS Group Ltd. v. Na-
tional Port Authority, 680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2013).
4. See Joel Slawotsky, Corporate Liability in Alien Tort Litigation, 1 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE
27, 41 (2011), http://www.vjil.org/articles/corporate-liability-in-alien-tort-litigation (“In today’s
world, both states and corporations have similar or even identical interests.  This coalition of
interest underscores the blurring of the distinction between states and corporations.”).  For ex-
ample, an issue that affects the global population is oil, which is extracted and processed through
both state-owned and private corporations. See generally Melaku Geboye Desta, The Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade
Agreements, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 523, 523, 545 (2003).  As another example, in the future, there
will almost certainly be litigation over control of the world’s fresh-water supply, which is also
currently in the hands of both state-owned and private corporations.  John Tagliabue, As Mul-
tinationals Run the Taps, Anger Rises Over Water for Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2002), http://
www.nytimes.com/2002/08/26/world/as-multinationals-run-the-taps-anger-rises-over-water-for-
profit.html.
221
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owned corporation, behaving identically in international commerce,
the current statutory framework allows for the state-owned corpora-
tion to be subject to different procedural rights in U.S. courts, solely
because of their ownership identity.5
A domestic state’s laws of incorporation define a corporation as a
legal entity; rules of its creation, organization, and dissolution also
stem from state law.6  But for their ownership or foundational origins,
state-owned corporations’ ties to a foreign state would be completely
unknown and irrelevant.7  Determining which jurisdictions allow for-
eign parties to litigate disputes, and what rights these jurisdictions
grant to these parties, is naturally of pressing concern as global com-
mercial relationships cause the world to shrink.  What kind of due
process do these state-owned international corporations have, where
should they litigate their disputes, and what kind of rights do they
have?
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)8 provides foreign
sovereigns and their organs with immunity for their public actions.9
However, if their conduct fits within one of the enumerated excep-
tions, the foreign sovereign can be hauled into U.S. courts.10  In do-
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b)(1)–(2) (2012); Frederick Watson Vaughan, Foreign States Are Foreign
States: Why Foreign State-Owned Corporations Are Not Persons Under the Due Process Clause,
45 GA. L. REV. 913, 917 (2011).
6. Corporations, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/corporations
(last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
7. See Vaughan, supra note 5, at 917. R
8. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2012)).
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–1607 (2012).  Congress left the term “organ” undefined.  Michael A.
Granne, Defining “Organ of a Foreign State” Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2008).  In USX Corp. v. Adriatic Insurance Company, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals determined that for an entity to be an “organ” of a foreign state
under FSIA, it must “engage in a public activity on behalf of the foreign government.”  345 F.3d
190, 208 (3d Cir. 2003).  The court also enumerated various factors to test for “organ” status,
none of which is determinative, namely
(1) the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; (2) the purpose of its activities;
(3) the degree of supervision by the government; (4) the level of government financial
support; (5) the entity’s employment policies, particularly regarding whether the for-
eign state requires the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; and (6) the
entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s laws.  To this list, we should
add an additional factor: (7) the ownership structure of the entity [where majority own-
ership is not necessary].
Id. at 209.  One commentator argues that the “ad hoc and subjective nature” of “organ or owner-
ship status” analysis prevents consistent application of an “objective” test from being consist-
ently applied. ERNESTO J. SANCHEZ, THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT DESKBOOK 85
(A.B.A., 2013).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (2012).  The exceptions include; when a state waives immunity,
engages in commercial activity, expropriates property contrary to international law, commits a
non-commercial tort in the United States, agrees to submit a dispute to arbitration, makes a
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mestic cases, the requirement of jurisdiction is a means of meeting the
due process protections guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution, whereby “[n]o person shall be . . .
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”11
The two main means of meeting the requirements of subject matter12
jurisdiction in domestic cases are diversity jurisdiction and federal
question jurisdiction.13  In Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
determined that foreign states are not “persons” under the Due Pro-
cess Clause because the clause aims to protect American citizens from
acts of their own government.14  The court reasoned that foreign
counterclaim and voluntarily appears in litigation, or sponsors terrorism. Id.  The commercial
activities exception is the most important and heavily litigated of the exceptions.  Joseph F. Mor-
rissey, Simplifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: If a Sovereign Acts Like a Private
Party, Treat It Like One, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 675, 676 (2005).
11. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).  Both subject-matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction are requirements for the exercise of federal court jurisdiction over a liti-
gant. HAZEL FOX QC & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 424 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 3d ed., 2013) (“Neither FSIA nor the House Report made clear whether or not
foreign States were entitled to the jurisdictional protection of the Due Process Clauses of the 5th
and 14th Amendments of the US Constitution.”).
12. Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear particular types of cases. Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/matterjurisdiction
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016).  A district court can accord priority to a personal jurisdiction or
forum non conveniens inquiry if there are doubts about a court’s jurisdiction over the subject
matter.  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007); Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co, 526 U.S. 574, 579 (1999).
13. Matt D. Basil et al., Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Outline, JENNER & BLOCK LLP
PRACTICE SERIES 10, 18 (2011), https://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/5507/original/Federal
_20Subject_20Matter_20Jurisdiction_20Outline_Jenner_20_26_20Block_0611.pdf?1323113751.
“The [United States] Constitution allows the judicial power of the United States to extend to
cases involving ‘[c]ontroversies . . . between Citizens of different States.’” Id. at 19 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2) (alteration in original).  Both Congress and the United States Constitution
vest federal district courts with subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); see U.S. CONST. art
III, § 2.  FSIA automatically accords personal jurisdiction when one of the enumerated excep-
tions applies, provided there has been adequate service of process and the requirement of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is met. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 271; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(b), 1608
(2012).  “Personal jurisdiction is the power of a court over the parties in the case,” requiring the
parties to have “certain minimum contacts with the forum in which the court sits.” Personal
Jurisdiction, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal_jurisdiction (last
visited Sept. 23, 2016); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (holding
that a party, including a corporation, may be subject to the jurisdiction of a state court if it has
“minimum contacts” with that state).  The Court in International Shoe held that the casual pres-
ence of a corporation or its agent in a state in a single or isolated incident is not enough to
establish personal jurisdiction. Id. at 317.  Rather, the Supreme Court of the United States con-
sidered systematic and continuous business operations to be sufficient contact with the state to
meet this threshold. Id.
14. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261, 264 (1990).
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states do not need these protections because they are juridical equals
of the U.S. government.15  In addition, because foreign states are not
“persons” under the Fifth Amendment, courts have reasoned that a
foreign sovereign waives personal jurisdiction under FSIA.16  Personal
jurisdiction is provided for in FSIA regardless.17
This Comment argues that foreign state agencies and instrumentali-
ties should be afforded the Constitutional due process protections that
are available to both foreign and domestic private corporations.  Cor-
porations were found to be “persons” with Constitutional rights in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,18 in direct contrast to the hold-
ing in Price holding that only natural persons have the right to Consti-
tutional protections.19  Judicial precedent shows that courts have
awarded due process protections on a limited basis and with a lack of
uniformity to particular individuals or corporations.20  Agencies and
instrumentalities of foreign governments should receive constitutional
protections because they are treated as separate legal entities with in-
dividual rights both by international and commercial law, as well as by
FSIA.21  For example, in the historic 1984 case of Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court accorded due
process protections to a privately owned, foreign corporation.22  While
the Supreme Court has not made a decision on whether foreign state
instrumentalities are entitled to due process protections, this Com-
ment argues that given the jurisprudence, there is every reason why
these instrumentalities should be afforded Constitutional protection.
15. Price, 294 F.3d at 98.  This analysis is accurate when considering the foreign policy implica-
tions of extending these protections to foreign states. Id. at 99.  The court gives as an example
the power of Congress to impose economic sanctions and freeze the assets of a foreign state
when the United States is trying to put pressure on that state, actions which could be challenged
as “deprivations of property without due process of law.” Id.
16. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 14A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3662.2 n.22 (4th ed.
2015) (quoting I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan, 351 F.3d 1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2003)).  If a foreign sovereign waives personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff does not have to prove
that the foreign sovereign had “minimum contacts” with the forum state, as required by Interna-
tional Shoe. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
18. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
19. Id. at 2768.
20. See, e.g., Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
2004) (holding that a French railroad’s prior existence as a private entity did not bar retroactive
application of FSIA); Sanchez v. City of Fresno, 914 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2012)
(holding that a municipality is a “person” that can be sued for civil rights violation).
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b)(1)–(2); see First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012)  (crafting
a ‘terrorism exception’ to the statute which allows attachment under certain circumstances).
22. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418–19 (1984).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL106.txt unknown Seq: 5 10-APR-17 11:18
2016] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FSIA 225
Based on the Hobby Lobby decision, corporations are “persons”;23
foreign agencies and instrumentalities are sufficiently similar to corpo-
rations and should be afforded the same constitutional protections.
Since foreign corporations have already been afforded Constitutional
protection, the association with a foreign-state should not prevent the
corporation from protections to which all other parties litigating in
U.S. courts are entitled.
Part II of this Comment details the background of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act.24  It also addresses how FSIA defines an
agency and instrumentality, and how that definition differs from the
judicial understanding of a foreign corporation.25  Part III argues that
foreign state-owned corporations are no different from private foreign
corporations for the purposes of jurisdiction,26 and then applies the
holding of Hobby Lobby to foreign sovereign-owned agencies and in-
strumentalities.27  Furthermore, Part III supplies a case study of for-
eign museums, and investigates the aspects of due process that already
exist for foreign museums litigating in U.S. courts.28  Finally, Part III
argues that the Immunity from Judicial Seizure statute coincides with
the due process right, which prevents a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law resulting in certain foreign state instrumentali-
ties already benefitting from some due process protections.29  Part IV
looks at the future implications of this argument, including (1)
whether giving due process protections to agencies or instrumentali-
ties will open the floodgates of litigation, and (2) the likely possibility
of such a change.30  Part V concludes that under FSIA, foreign sover-
eign agencies and instrumentalities should be given due process pro-
tections, and that the courts should look to the IFJS as a comparable
statute which gives these due process protections to museums, a type
of foreign sovereign agency.
23. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
24. See infra notes 36–77 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 78–131 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 198–221 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 222–54 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 255–317 and accompanying text.  Most foreign museums are state-owned
and are entitled to apply for immunity from seizure of their artwork prior to a loan to a United
States museum. See Seizure Under Judicial Process of Cultural Objects Imported for Temporary
Exhibition or Display Statute (Immunity from Judicial Seizure (IFJS)), 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012).
30. See infra notes 318–34 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
This Section first provides a history of FSIA and its definition of
agencies and instrumentalities.31  Section B provides a definition of
foreign corporations and their treatment in the Helicopteros case.32
Section C summarizes the history and background of the 2014 Su-
preme Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.33  Section D
examines the history of the Due Process Clause and the judicial inter-
pretation of “personhood.”34  Finally, Section E addresses the history
and purpose of the Immunity from Judicial Seizure statute.35
A. FSIA & Agencies and Instrumentalities
FSIA was enacted in 1976 to codify the “restrictive” theory of im-
munity, whereby foreign states are immune from litigation in U.S.
courts only for their public acts, or jure imperii, while their private
acts, or jure gestionis, are not immune.36  Public acts are  “of a govern-
mental nature typically performed by a foreign state”37 for public ben-
efit, while acts that are governmental in nature are characterized as
“political, diplomatic, or military in nature.”38 Such acts include the
expropriations of an alien’s property within the boundaries of the sov-
ereign state.39  Private acts are those that do not directly benefit the
public, such as civil or commercial activities in which the sovereign
acts as a private individual.40 FSIA also serves to transfer responsibil-
ity for immunity determinations from the Executive Branch and the
31. See infra notes 36–77 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 78–131 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 132–57 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 158–74 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 175–93 and accompanying text.
36. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 28; see 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012) (“Under international law,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activi-
ties are concerned.”).  Prior to the restrictive theory of immunity, sovereign states followed abso-
lute theory, whereby a foreign state had immunity at all times, unless the state consented to be
sued. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR CORPORATIONS 3
(2d ed., 2003).
37. David P. Stewart, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: A Guide for Judges, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE 1–2 (2013) (quoting Cassirer v. Kingdom
of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1026 (9th Cir. 2010)).
38. Judi L. Abbott, The Noncommercial Torts Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 9 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 134, 135 n.11 (1985).
39. George Kahale, III, Characterizing Nationalizations For Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act and the Act of State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 391, 409 (1983).  An exam-
ple of expropriation of property would include the seizure of an alien’s funds from a United
States bank account.
40. Abbott, supra note 38, at 135 n.11.  For example, a sovereign acts in its private capacity as
an employer.
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State Department to the Judicial Branch.41  FSIA is primarily a juris-
dictional statute; it does not address the sufficiency or substantive na-
ture of a claim.42  Rather, it “provides the sole basis for establishing
jurisdiction over foreign sovereign defendant in U.S. courts.”43  Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, Con-
gress sought to bring order to the legal inconsistency in immunity
determinations by way of ratification of FSIA.44
Other purposes of FSIA include; depoliticizing immunity decisions
by taking them out of the hands of the Executive and the State De-
partment and vesting them in the federal courts45 and providing “defi-
nite, appropriate rules on competence, jurisdiction, mode of trial,
rules of decision, service of process, and venue.”46  Bringing the treat-
ment of foreign states in U.S. courts in line with the treatment of the
United States and its corporations, both domestically and internation-
ally,47 providing “a balanced possibility for execution of a judgment
against a foreign state,”48 and assuring uniform treatment of foreign
states in U.S. federal courts under the legal principle of comity are
also purposes of FSIA.49
41. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 28.  Prior to the codification of FSIA, foreign nations would put
diplomatic pressure on the Department of State to file suggestions of immunity “in cases in
which immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory.”  Republic of Aus-
tria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690 (2004).  When foreign nations failed to ask the Department of
State for the right to immunity, the courts were forced to make immunity determinations. Id. at
690–91 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1982)).  As a
result, the responsibility for determining sovereign immunity “[was] made in two different
branches,” which, unsurprisingly, created unnecessary complications. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
42. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620
(1983).
43. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 41.
44. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 677.  The House of Representatives’ Report in 1976 stated that “uni-
formity in decision . . . is desirable . . . to reduc[e] the foreign policy implications of immunity
determinations and assure the litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on purely
legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.” H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13
(1976).
45. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604 (2012).
46. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 33–34 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 45 (1976); see 28
U.S.C. § 1608 (2012).
47. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 34 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1604.
48. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 34 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 12); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605.
49. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 33–34; see 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (“[T]he determination by
United States courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states and
litigants in United States courts.”).
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According to FSIA, an “agency or instrumentality” means any en-
tity “which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise.”50  A
legal person is “the subject of rights and duties” and has the “capac-
ity” to be “a party” to legal relations.51  Moreover, FSIA’s definition
requires the entity to be “an organ of a foreign state or political subdi-
vision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership inter-
est is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.”52  In
2003, the U.S. Supreme Court in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,53 held
that “only direct ownership of a majority of shares by the foreign state
satisfies the statutory requirement.”54  “[W]here the foreign state is
not a direct majority owner of the entity, the entity” must “demon-
strate that it is an organ of the state.”55  An organ of a state is gener-
ally understood by the term “arm of the state,” although Congress
ultimately left the term undefined.56  Finally, in accordance with
FSIA, an agency or instrumentality is “neither a citizen of a State of
the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (e) of this title, nor
created under the laws of any third country.”57
Thus, FSIA’s definition intends to include corporations, associa-
tions, foundations, or any other entity which can sue or be sued, which
can contract in its own name and hold property in its own name under
the laws of the foreign state where it was created.58  As non-exhaus-
tive examples of entities that would be considered to be agencies or
instrumentalities, the House Report cited a state trading corporation,
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(1) (2012).
51. Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 283–84 (1928).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
53. 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) (crafting a ‘ter-
rorism exception’ to the statute which allows attachment under certain circumstances).
54. Id.
55. Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the Modern Era, 18 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2008).
56. Michael A. Granne, Defining “Organ of a Foreign State” Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 2, 16–17 (2008).  Michael Granne suggests that
the court, in evaluating this threshold, should ask five questions:
First, has the foreign state ceded any of its core and traditional sovereign powers to the
entity?; Second, there are sufficient financial ties between the foreign state and the
entity such that any award would be paid out of the public treasury?; Third, how does
the foreign state treat the entity under local law and is that treatment significantly dif-
ferent from its treatment of other similar entities?; Fourth, do U.S. courts give agency
or instrumentality status to similar entities in the United States and other foreign
states?; Finally, does the foreign state control how the entity conducts its business be-
yond what is customary in that state and, if not, can it exercise such extreme control?
Id. at 8–9.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b); Granne, supra note 9, at 16 (“Almost all litigation about whether an
entity meets the threshold criteria of ‘foreign state’ revolves around § 1603(b)(2).”).
58. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15.
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a central bank, and a shipping line or airline.59  An agency or instru-
mentality is meant to perform a public function in accordance with the
restrictive theory of immunity as mentioned above.60  Under FSIA,
“an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the foreign sovereign . . . engages in
core functions that are predominantly commercial rather than govern-
mental,” but still serves a public function.61  A foreign-government-
owned corporation or other agency or instrumentality derives a re-
strictive immunity from its relationship to a foreign state irrespective
of the nature of the functions the corporation performs.62
In 2004, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Filler v. Hanvit
Bank,63 identified five factors that are relevant to determining
whether an entity is an organ of a foreign state for purposes of FSIA:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national
purpose;
(2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity;
(3) whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employ-
ees and pays their salaries;
(4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in the
[foreign] country; and
(5) how the entity is treated under foreign state law.64
A foreign state organ can serve many purposes.  Rather than requir-
ing the foreign state itself to obtain resources for large scale interna-
tional investments, a foreign state organ can serve as a vehicle through
which the foreign state indirectly obtains the same resources.65  In-
deed, in First National City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior
de Cuba,66 the Supreme Court pointed out that agencies and instru-
mentalities enjoy more autonomy from close political control and self-
determination than is generally enjoyed by traditionally understood
political subdivisions which are more connected to the governing
power.67
59. Id. at 15–16; Granne, supra note 9, at 15 n.75 (“Courts have interpreted ‘agency or instru-
mentality’ broadly.”).
60. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 72.
61. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1163 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Garb v.
Republic of Poland, 440 F.3d 579, 591 (2d Cir. 2006)), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 580 F. 3d 1048
(9th Cir. 2009), on rehearing en Banc, 616 F. 3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
62. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 65.
63. Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2004).
64. Id. (alteration in original).
65. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 611,
624–25 (1983).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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FSIA recognizes the reality that agencies and instrumentalities are
entities separate from the government and, accordingly treat them dif-
ferent than states.68  FSIA’s service of process requirements, one of
the mandatory requirements for personal jurisdiction, prescribes one
set of rules for foreign states and their political subdivisions, and an-
other for their agencies and instrumentalities.69  For example, FSIA
section 1608(a)(2) provides that one of the ways service may be pro-
vided to a foreign state or political subdivision is by delivery of the
“summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable interna-
tional convention on service of judicial documents.”70  For agencies
and instrumentalities, however, FSIA adds that if no special arrange-
ment exists delivery may be made “either to an officer, a managing or
general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process in the United States.”71  Congress
distinguished an agency or instrumentality as an organ that is not ex-
plicitly under the realm of control of the sovereign, such that service
on an agency or instrumentality through diplomatic channels would be
inappropriate.72
Another difference in the treatment of foreign states, agencies, or
instrumentalities is that “it is easier to establish jurisdiction under the
international takings exception over an agency or instrumentality than
it is over a foreign sovereign itself.”73  In addition, FSIA prevents
courts from awarding punitive damages against a state, but not against
an agency or instrumentality.74  Further, it is also “easier to attach or
execute [a judgment] on the property of an agency or instrumentality
than it is the property of a foreign sovereign.”75
The judiciary has also formulated its understanding of agencies and
instrumentalities.  In United States v. Noriega,76 the district court cre-
ated a five-factor test describing what constitutes an “instrumental-
68. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 71 (noting that agencies and instrumentalities are subject to
different treatment regarding their potential liability for punitive damages, service of process, or
appropriate enforcement and remedial measures).
69. Id. at 273.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(2) (2012).
71. Id. § 1608(b)(2).
72. Id.
73. Alex Haller, The FSIA, Agency and Agents: Avoiding a Basic Pitfall, FSIA LAW (Jan. 20,
2014), http://fsialaw.com/2014/01/20/the-fsia-agency-and-agents-avoiding-a-basic-pitfall/; see 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
74. Haller, supra note 73; see 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2012).
75. Haller, supra note 73; see Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82,
99 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
76. Minutes in Chamber Order at 9, United States v. Noriega, No. 10-01031 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
20, 2011).
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ity”: (1) the entity provides a service to its citizens; (2) the primary
officers are appointed by government officials; (3) the entity is largely
financed through government appropriations; (4) the entity is vested
with controlling power; and (5) the entity is understood to be per-
forming official functions.77  Although the case concerned the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,78 this factor test should be applicable
when the institutions being discussed are fundamentally of a similar
nature.  An examination of the history of the Due Process Clause and
how the judiciary’s application of “personhood” to foreign states and
their agencies and instrumentalities supports this argument.
B. Due Process Clause & “Personhood”
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution state that, “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”79  The pur-
pose of the Due Process Clause is to recognize and protect the citi-
zens’ individual liberty interest and property interest through
procedural safeguards.80  More specifically, the protected “liberty in-
terest” is freedom from the government imposing burdens upon peo-
ple “except in accordance with the valid laws of the land.”81  The first
Supreme Court decision construing the Due Process Clause explained
that it serves as a limit on the branches of government, thereby ensur-
ing the Constitutional requirement of separation of powers.82  The
Due Process Clause also serves as a restraint on all other legislative
made law, as the Constitution is the “supreme Law of the Land.”83
However, these public policy interests are the only ones encompassed
by the Amendments’ protection of liberty and property.  The Due
Process Clause is meant to be more than a “mere technical service of
process,” as positivists would have us interpret the clause.84  In Price,
77. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 9, United States v. Noriega, No. CR-10-01031-AHM
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011).
78. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
79. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
80. Price, 294 F.3d at 98; see also IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 1:18 (2015).
81. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 950 (2009).
82. Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 458 (1986) (citing Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp.
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277 (1855)).
83. Vaughan, supra note 5, at 921 n.36 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”)).
84. Redish & Marshall, supra note 82, at 458; see Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).  Positivists, in opposition to natural law theorists, believe that laws are the writ-
ten by human beings, and do not necessarily have any connection with morals.
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals advanced that the core concept of
due process is to safeguard a party from arbitrary exercises of govern-
mental power “unrestrained by the established principles of private
right and distributive justice.”85  A court must be able to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant corporation to enforce a judgment
without violating the principles of due process.86
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,87 the Supreme Court “as-
sum[ed], without deciding, that a foreign state is a ‘person’ for pur-
poses of the Due Process Clause.”88  The Court proceeded to
determine whether personal jurisdiction was satisfied.89  Argentina
satisfied the minimum contacts test—systematic and continuous busi-
ness operations—necessary to satisfy the constitutional test for per-
sonal jurisdiction enumerated in International Shoe.90  As a result, the
Court found that FSIA properly asserted jurisdiction over the Repub-
lic of Argentina, who refinanced the debts they owed to foreign credi-
tors and attempted to reschedule the bonds, all of which resulted in
Weltover, Inc., suing the Republic of Argentina for breach of con-
tract.91  The Court, however, cited South Carolina v. Katzenbach,92
which found that “States of the Union” are not “persons” for pur-
poses of the Due Process Clause.93  The Katzenbach case concerned a
bill in equity for determining the validity of selected provisions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.94  The States sought a declaration that
these provisions were constitutional, partly because they deny due
process to the States.95
Embracing Katzenbach, the court in Price reasoned that no reason-
able interpretation of the word “person” can be expanded to encom-
85. Price, 294 F.3d at 98 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998)).
86. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).  The Court in International Shoe
asserted personal jurisdiction requirements for compliance with due process protection, and al-
lowed certain entities that are not actual, or “natural,” persons to qualify for due process pur-
poses, among them being private corporations. Id. at 316–19.
87. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
88. Id. at 620.
89. Id. at 609.
90. Id. at 757; see Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–19.
91. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 610.
92. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1996), abrogated by Shelby County v.
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2616 (2013).
93. Id. at 323.  One Commentator argues, however, that the reasoning in Katzenbach should
be disregarded in the present analysis because the case was challenging the substantive provi-
sions of congressional acts and not the jurisdictional reach of courts, which is all FSIA concerns.
DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 182–83.
94. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 307.
95. Id. at 323.
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pass the States.96  Therefore, unless there was a “compelling reason to
treat foreign sovereigns more favorably” than the States, it does not
logically follow to treat foreign states as “persons” under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.97  The court in Price went on to explain that it would be
“highly incongruous” to allow foreign nations, who are aliens to the
United States Constitution, to have greater rights under the Fifth
Amendment than which are afforded to domestic states.98  In that
same vein, the court noted that “foreign nations are the juridical
equals of the [U.S.] government” and are not subjugated to the power
of the U.S. government, unlike private American citizens; therefore,
the foreign nations do not need the same protection from the U.S.
government that the Due Process Clause guarantees to its natural citi-
zens.99  In addition, the court reasoned that foreign nations have other
means of seeking judicial remedy of their disputes, namely in the In-
ternational Court of Justice.100
As a result, the ruling in Price affirmed that foreign governments
are not “persons” and do not have access to Constitutional due pro-
cess protections.101  Following Price, every court to consider whether a
foreign state qualifies as a “person” has answered in the negative.102
Despite this extensive judicial review, the Supreme Court  itself has
not addressed the question of whether the Fifth Amendment applies
to foreign states for the purpose of personal jurisdiction;103 neverthe-
less, a general consensus exists among the courts that the clause is
inapplicable where foreign sovereign are concerned.104  In each case,
96. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quot-
ing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24).
97. Id. at 96.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 98.
100. Id.  The purpose of the International Court of Justice is “to settle, in accordance with
international law, legal disputes . . . [between foreign States] and to give advisory opinions on
legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.”
The Court, INT’L COURT OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1 (last visited Jan.
24, 2016).
101. Price, 294 F.3d at 99–100.  The court noted, however, that the holding does not extend to
“other entities that fall within the FSIA’s definition of ‘foreign state’ – including corporations in
which a foreign state owns a majority interest.” Id.
102. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 288; see, e.g., GSS Group Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d
805, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding that a Liberian government-owned corporation was, as an
independent judicial entity, a “person entitled to due process protection”); Frontera Res. Azer.
Corp. v. State Oil Co. of the Azer. Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that foreign
states are not “persons” for due process purposes, and noting that the Supreme Court has ac-
corded due process protections to privately owned foreign corporations, but whether, and to
what extent, the Court would do so for state-owned foreign corporations has yet to be decided).
103. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 289.
104. Id.
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the court found there were sufficient minimum contacts with the
United States to allow for personal jurisdiction to be established on
the part of the U.S. courts.105
In Price, the court declined to express an opinion as to whether
agencies and instrumentalities, separate from foreign sovereigns,
could be considered persons under the Due Process Clause.106  The
case law history of the rights of agencies and instrumentalities comes
mostly from the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit.107  Common law
jurisdictions generally presume that government instrumentalities es-
tablished as juridical entities, distinct and independent from their sov-
ereign, should generally be treated as separate entities.108  In Bancec,
however, the Supreme Court addressed whether a foreign state immu-
nity is equivalent to a foreign state for liability purposes and found
that the above common law principle can be disregarded where a cor-
porate entity is so comprehensively controlled by its majority share-
holder that a “principal and agent” relationship is created.109  Where
this is the case, one entity may be held liable for the actions of the
other.110  The Court also argued in favor of public policy and against
the fraud and injustice that would result if the corporate form was
blindly adhered to in attributing liability.111
Bancec involved a bank in Cuba established by the Cuban Govern-
ment as an “official autonomous credit institution for foreign trade”
which had “full juridical capacity . . . of its own.”112  The Cuban bank
sought payment from an American bank, whose assets in Cuba were
seized shortly thereafter, for Cuban sugar delivered to the United
States.113  The Cuban bank, Bancec, was later nationalized at the time
of suit to recover the seized assets.114  Bancec claimed that according
to FSIA, its separate judicial status shielded it from liability for the
105. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 182–83; see GSS Group, 680 F.3d at 810 (upholding the
TMR Energy treatment of the Port Authority as a “separate ‘person’ entitled to due process
protection. That protection includes the right to assert a minimum contacts defense.”); Frontera
Res. Azer. Corp., 582 F.3d at 398.
106. Price, 294 F.3d at 99–100.
107. SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 290–91.
108. Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 626–27 (1983), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012)
(creating a “terrorism exception” to the statute, which allows attachment under certain
circumstances).
109. Id. at 629.
110. Id. at 619.
111. Id. at 629 (quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)).
112. Id. at 613 (alteration in original) (quoting Law No. 793, Art. 1 (1960)).
113. Id.
114. Bancec, 462 U.S. at 614–15.
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actions of the Cuban government.115  Although FSIA does not con-
sider substantive liability,116 the holding in Bancec does have an effect
upon the debate concerning personhood and due process of foreign
state instrumentalities.
TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Property Fund of Ukraine involved the
application of the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process
Clause to a Ukrainian oil fund.117  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
sought to determine whether the state fund had a constitutional status
separate from the State of Ukraine.118  The court followed the reason-
ing in Bancec and Foremost-McKesson v. Islamic Republic of Iran,119
another case decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which
held that a foreign state is subject to suit if the sovereign wields suffi-
cient control over the instrumentality to create a principal to agent
relationship.120  The court in TMR Energy determined the fund’s sta-
tus as a “person” for the purposes of the Due Process Clause depends
on whether the State of Ukraine exerted “sufficient control” over the
fund to qualify it as an agent of the state.121  The court did not define
the standard of “sufficient control,” but it followed the rationalization
in Foremost-McKesson, where an agency relationship has been cre-
ated between the sovereign and the corporation.122  If the threshold
for “sufficient control” is attained, then “there is no reason to extend
[to an agency] . . . a constitutional right that is denied to the sovereign
itself.”123 The court found that the fund was “an agent of the State,
barely distinguishable from an executive department of the govern-
ment,” and thus was not an independent juridical entity.”124  The
fund, therefore, like the State of Ukraine, was “not a ‘person’ for the
115. Id. at 620; see TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 300–01 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).  The TMR court dismissed their prior “core functions” test, whereby “an entity that is
an ‘integral part of a foreign state’s political structure’ is to be treated as the foreign state itself,”
whereas an entity with a “structure and core function” that is commercial is to be treated as an
“agency or instrumentality of the state.” Id. at 300 (quoting Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea
Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
116. See SANCHEZ, supra note 9, at 290–91.
117. TMR, 411 F.3d at 298.
118. Id. at 301.
119. Id. at 301; Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 446 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
120. Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 446–47.  This holding followed the reasoning in Bancec.
See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 626–27.
121. TMR, 411 F.3d at 301 (quoting Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 446–47).
122. Id. at 301–02.
123. Id. at 301.  This reasoning is similar to the court’s reasoning in Price and Katzenbach
concerning due process for foreign states. See Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24).
124. TMR, 411 F.3d at 302.
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purposes of the due process clause” and could not assert minimum
contacts for U.S. jurisdiction.125
The only judicial opinion to directly address the due process rights
of a foreign state’s agencies and instrumentalities is Empresa Cubana
Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Department of
Treasury.126  The District Court of D.C. recognized that Cubaexport, a
corporation that exports food and other products from Cuba, was a
“state-owned enterprise” and was governed in accordance with the
instructions issued to it by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Trade in line
with the state’s foreign trade policy.127  Despite this governance struc-
ture, the district court applied the “sufficient control” test from TMR
Energy and determined that Cubaexport was not an agent of the
state.128  The court reached this conclusion by characterizing
Cubaexport as a corporation that “engages in commercial operations,
not governmental functions.”129  The court continued, in an obvious
reference to FSIA’s definition of an agency or instrumentality, that
Cubaexport “enters into contracts in its own name, pays taxes to
Cuba, and applied for registration of the HAVANA CLUB trademark
[in the United States] in its own name.”130  Though the court relied
upon the previously mentioned case law in its analysis, it merely dis-
tinguished the facts of the prior cases, which it found were not synony-
mous with the facts of the case at issue.131  A more in-depth due
process analysis can be found in the recent case, Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.
C. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
The threshold requirement of the Due Process Clause is that it must
apply to “persons.”132  The 2014 Supreme Court of the United States
decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. formally extended
due process protections to corporations, or “artificial entities.”133  The
issue in Hobby Lobby was whether the Religious Freedom Restora-
125. Id.
126. Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos Varios v. U.S. Dept. of Trea-
sury, 606 F. Supp. 2d 59, 78–80 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
127. Id. at 76.
128. Id. (quoting TMR, 411 F.3d at 301).
129. Id. at 76–77.  This distinction harkens back to the original idea of restrictive immunity
and the purpose of FSIA: foreign states are immune for their public actions, not their commer-
cial, private ones. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
130. Empresa Cubana, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 77; see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2012).
131. Empresa Cubana, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78.
132. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
133. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
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tion Act of 1993134 (RFRA) permitted the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to require that corporations, such as
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties, provide health insur-
ance coverage for contraception that violated the genuinely-held relig-
ious beliefs of the companies’ owners under the regulations
established in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA).135  The Supreme Court held that when applied to closely held
corporations, the ACA regulations that imposed the contraceptive
mandate violated the RFRA.136
Hobby Lobby Stores, an arts and crafts company founded and
owned by the Evangelical Christian Green family, filed an action
against the contraception rule in the ACA, which required that all
U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptives be cov-
ered by employer-sponsored health insurance plans.137  HHS specified
the types of preventative care that should be covered in these em-
ployer-sponsored health insurance plans.138  HHS, however, also ex-
empted religious employers, non-profit organizations that object to
this required service, employers providing grandfathered plans, and
employers with fewer than fifty employees from this component of the
ACA.139  Hobby Lobby argued that they should not be forced to pro-
vide funding for emergency contraceptives because it violated their
rights under the RFRA.140  The RFRA, which Congress passed in
1993, requires strict scrutiny when a neutral law of general applicabil-
ity substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion.141  The Su-
preme Court was asked whether for-profit companies, such as Hobby
Lobby, have a right to exercise religious freedom as a “person” under
the RFRA.142
134. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4
(2012)).
135. Id. at 2754–55. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 300gg-11 (2012)).  The ACA requires certain em-
ployers’ group health plans to provide “preventive care and screenings” for women “without any
cost sharing requirements.”  42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2012).
136. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
137. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2765, 2775; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012).
138. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789.
139. Id. at 2763–64; see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18011(a)–(e) (2012); 45
C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2014).
140. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C § 2000bb-1 (2012).
141. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(a) (2012).
142. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
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The Court analyzed the personhood of a corporation because the
RFRA provisions employ the term “persons.”143  Employing the per-
functory statutory interpretation method, the Court turned to the Dic-
tionary Act of 1871.144  The Dictionary Act instructs courts to apply
definitions of certain common words (including “person”) to all fed-
eral statutes.145  The Dictionary Act, however, has not been applied in
a uniform manner by the courts since the time of its enactment.146
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court applied the Dictionary Act in
Hobby Lobby.147  The Dictionary Act states that “the wor[d] ‘person’
. . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partner-
ships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”148
On account of the lack of evidence in the Constitution indicating oth-
erwise, the word “person” has a different meaning than that in the
Dictionary Act, the Act is highly persuasive that the word “person” in
the Constitution applies to corporations as well as individuals.149
The Court examined the justification for the familiar legal fiction
that corporations are legal entities and “persons.”150  The doctrine was
first affirmed in 1888 in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v.
Pennsylvania,151 in which the Court stated, “Under the designation of
‘person’ there is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such
corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a special
purpose and permitted to do business under a particular name and
have a succession of members without dissolution.”152  The doctrine of
corporate personhood has evolved significantly from its first iteration
over 125 years ago.153  Indeed, the first legally recognized corporate
143. Id. at 2767 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a)–(b)).  The RFRA prohibits the government
from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added).
144. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
145. Emily J. Barnet, Hobby Lobby and the Dictionary Act, 124 YALE L.J.F. 11, 11–12 (2014)
(citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
146. Id. at 12.
147. 1 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
148. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1).
149. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; Barnet, supra note 145, at 12; see U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
150. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
151. 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
152. Id. at 189.
153. See Rick Ungar, Founding Fathers Spinning in Their Graves as SCOTUS Rules That Cor-
porations Are People Too, FORBES (June 30, 2014, 12:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rick-
ungar/2014/06/30/founding-fathers-spinning-in-their-graves-as-scotus-rules-that-corporations-
are-people-too/2/ (illustrating the historical evolution of the legal corporate personhood doc-
trine).  Prior to Hobby Lobby, the case that provided the most sweeping expansion of corporate
personhood was Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which granted corporations the
right to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment of the Constitution.  558 U.S.
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constitutional right flowed from the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.154  The Hobby Lobby Court reasoned that the
purpose of this fiction is to ensure protection for human beings.155  A
corporation is composed solely of a group of human beings organized
to achieve a common end, typically profits, but not strictly so.156  Pro-
tecting corporations from government expropriation of their privately
held property without compensation protects all human beings who
“have a stake in the corporation’s financial well-being.”157  It is imper-
ative, therefore, to discuss what is meant when discussing “foreign
corporations,” and how they differ from “domestic corporations.”
D. Foreign Corporations
The Internal Revenue Code uses the term “foreign” to simply mean
“a corporation or partnership which is not domestic.”158  Delaware’s
definition of a “foreign corporation” is “any corporation created by,
or organized under, the laws of another state, government, or coun-
try.”159  The etymology of the word “corporation” includes the Latin
word corpus, meaning body.160  With this origin in mind, the law in the
at 310; Alex Park, 10 Supreme Court Rulings – Before Hobby Lobby – That Turned Corpora-
tions Into People, MOTHER JONES (July 10 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/
2014/07/how-supreme-court-turned-corporations-people-200-year-saga; see U.S. CONST. amend.
I.  During the 2008 presidential elections, the Political Action Committee “Citizens United”
sought to broadcast television advertisements criticizing presidential candidate Hillary Rodham
Clinton. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–21.  Since doing so would violate the 2002 Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, which prohibited corporations and unions from paying for media that
mentioned any candidate immediately preceding elections, the Supreme Court of the United
States made the spending restriction unconstitutional, and thus gave non-persons free speech
rights. Id. at 320–21, 347, 361, 372; see 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2012); see
Nick Bentley, What is Citizens United?, RECLAIM DEMOCRACY, http://reclaimdemocracy.org/
who-are-citizens-united/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).
154. Paul R. Hale, It Is Hard to Make Everyone Happy: The Rights Gained and Lost by Com-
panies and Employees in the Context of the Affordable Care Act Contraception Mandate, 39 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 323, 326 (2015).
155. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 26 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012).  This Comment uses the IRS definition of a foreign corporation,
as well as the definition in the Delaware Code, for their simplicity.
159. 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations § 1 (2011).  This is the same definition used in the
Delaware Code, which states that “the words ‘foreign corporation’ mean a corporation under
the laws of any jurisdiction other than this State.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(a) (2015).  Dela-
ware is known throughout the United States as the state in which it is best to register a corpora-
tion, because Delaware has the most favorable laws for businesses. See E. Norman Veasey,
Musings From the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 165, 167–68 (2004).  For
the purposes of this Comment, the definition is somewhat adapted so that “this State” is as-
sumed to refer to the United States as a whole, instead of just the State of Delaware.
160. Hale, supra note 154, at 323.
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United States has recognized that a corporation can do almost all of
the same things that a natural person can do.161
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall is a landmark
case that gave a private foreign corporation the right to access Consti-
tutional due process protections.162  In its reasoning, the U.S. Supreme
Court relied upon the legal concept of personal jurisdiction, also
known as in personam jurisdiction.163 Helicopteros Nacionales is the
preeminent case concerning the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as they relate to a foreign cor-
poration.164  In Helicopteros, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death
action  in a Texas state court against a Colombian corporation.165  The
matter was appealed up to the Supreme Court which determined that
the Colombian corporation’s contacts with Texas were insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause necessary to allow
the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the corporation.166  The
Court determined that, because the wrongful death claims did not
arise out of and were not related to the contacts of the Colombian
corporation with Texas, jurisdiction could be asserted under the Four-
teenth Amendment only on the basis of general personal jurisdic-
tion.167  The Court required that the due process protections be
satisfied before it would hear the case.168
When a defendant is not physically present within the territory of
the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts with the forum to
161. Id.  For example, a corporation can bring lawsuits, buy and sell property, enter into con-
tracts, pay taxes, commit crimes, and enjoy freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Id.
at 323–24.  Corporations are restricted, however, by their inability to vote. Id. at 324.  Nonethe-
less, corporations have special power in their ability to lobby for legislation that will benefit
them.  Binyamin Applebaum, What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America, N.Y. TIMES
(July 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/magazine/what-the-hobby-lobby-ruling-
means-for-america.html.
162. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–18 (1984).  The
Court recognized, “Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State
and the foreign corporation.” Id. at 414; see 1 BALDWIN’S OHIO PRAC. CIV. PRAC. § 4.3:13,
Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2014).
163. Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 408.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 419, 412.
166. Id. at 418–19.
167. Id. at 416–19; see also BALDWIN’S supra, note 162.  General jurisdiction “allows a defen-
dant to be sued for any activities it has committed anywhere,” and is thus a hard standard for a
plaintiff to prove.  William Baud, Opinion Recap: A Stricter View of General Jurisdiction,
SCOTUS BLOG (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/opinion-recap-a-
stricter-view-of-general-jurisdiction/.
168. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413.
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satisfy “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”169  This
means litigation can only be fair, as due process alludes to, if service
upon the defendant is “reasonably calculated to give him notice of the
proceedings, and as provides an opportunity to be heard” in the
case.170  In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court treated an alien defen-
dant headquartered in a foreign country the same way it would treat a
defendant in a domestic state.171  Unlike an individual, however, a
corporation’s presence within a domestic jurisdiction can be ascer-
tained only by “those activities of the corporation’s agent within the
state” which courts can use to satisfy the demands of due process.172
Since the Judiciary has not yet provided a consistent and comprehen-
sive answer regarding the due process protections afforded to the
agencies and instrumentalities of foreign states, it is worth considering
another statute, the Immunity from Judicial Seizure173 statute, which
does afford the agencies and instrumentalities due process
protections.174
E. Immunity from Seizure Statute
The Immunity from Judicial Seizure statute was enacted in 1965,
vesting in the United States’ Executive Branch the “authority to grant
a work of art or other object of cultural significance that is on loan for
temporary exhibition or display, when it is within the national interest
of the United States, immunity from seizure by U.S. courts.”175  “The
United States was the first country to introduce immunity from
seizure for cultural objects.”176  One of the reasons the legislation
arose was a proposed loan of objects from Russia to the University of
Virginia during the 1960s, whereby the Soviet Government refused to
process the loan unless the United States implemented statutory pro-
tections for the loaned Soviet art.177  IFJS is administered by the De-
169. Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945)).
170. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
171. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 187.
172. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–17.
173. Immunity from seizure under judicial process of cultural objects imported for temporary
exhibit or display, Pub. L. 89-259, 79 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012)).
174. Id. § 245(a); see NOUT VAN WOUDENBERG, STATE IMMUNITY AND CULTURAL OBJECTS
ON LOAN 152–53 (2012).
175. Sheppard Mullin, Museum Loans – Part Two, ART LAW BLOG (Apr. 23, 2013), http://
www.artlawgallery.com/2013/04/articles/art-museums-and-cultural-organizations/museum-loans-
part-two/.
176. WOUDENBERG, supra note 174, at 152.
177. Id.  It has also been suggested that IFJS was passed as a reaction to the Second Hick-
enlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), which reduced the efficacy of the judicial act of
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partment of State under the Mutual Educational and Cultural
Exchange Program.178  This statute “fulfills an important role in fos-
tering the exchange of art and cultural works between the United
States and other nations.”179  IFJS was passed to address situations in
which, “[a]s a condition to the loan, [a foreign nation] insisted on a
grant of immunity from seizure as protection against [its] former . . .
citizens who had valid claims to the title of the works.”180  Thus, a
litigant with a claim to artwork may not seize the sovereign’s property
while the property is within the United States.181  IFJS also prevents
prejudgment attachments for jurisdiction or for security on a potential
judgment, prejudgment injunctions, and post-judgments
attachments.182
IFJS requires that the covered objects have cultural significance,
that an agreement exists between the lender and “one or more cul-
tural or educational institutions within the United States,” and that
the loan must be limited to temporary exhibition in the United States
at a cultural exhibition “administered, operated, or sponsored, with-
out profit, by any such cultural or educational institution.”183  “Immu-
nity from seizure maybe granted under two fundamental approaches:
either protection is [deemed] automatic when recognized criteria are
met, or advanced application is required,” after which the application
is reviewed by the Department of State.184  As a prerequisite, muse-
ums must apply for this protection, at which point the U.S. State De-
partment may issue a notice that a certain object is of the cultural
significance required under IFJS.185  Therefore, the temporary display
of the object within the United States is deemed to be in the national
state doctrine in preventing the seizure of art works owned by foreign sovereigns.  Malewicz v.
City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
178. Id.
179. Id. Between 1995 and 2005, “the State Department . . . published immunity notices
under § 2459 for more than 600 exhibits.” Id.
180. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rodney M. Zerbe, Immunity from Seizure for
Artworks on Loan to United States Museums, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1121, 1124 n.21 (1985));
see United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 236–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concerning
the application of IFJS to a museum exhibiting a painting that may have been stolen from its
original owners). Portrait of Wally is considered the preeminent IFJS case because the lending
museum failed to apply for immunity from seizure under the federal legislative system, and as a
result, the paintings were seized after their former owners sought a subpoena. WOUDENBERG,
supra note 174, at 184–89.
181. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
182. Mullin, supra note 175; see 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012).
183. 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a).
184. WOUDENBERG, supra note 174, at 7.
185. Id. at 153.
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interest, and the object becomes exempt from seizure while it is in the
country.186
The application must include: (1) a schedule of all the important
items; (2) the loan agreements between the foreign owner or custo-
dian and the U.S. cultural or educational institutions; (3) any related
commercial agreements; (4) a “[l]ist of expected venues and dates of
exhibition, especially the date of arrival into the U.S.; (5) a
“[s]tatement indicating that the exhibition does not provide profit to
the borrowing or participating institutions; (6) a “[p]rovenances state-
ment concerning the works to be borrowed; (7) a “Cultural Signifi-
cance Statement” concerning the imported objects; and (8) the
educational and cultural nature of the U.S. participants.187  The
United States in its amicus brief for Malewicz, stated that at the time
of enactment, the primary concern for sovereigns was “the exercise of
in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction over artwork to resolve claims as
to its ownership, because in personam jurisdiction over foreign states
was generally not at issue.”188  Nevertheless, the District Court of
D.C. has determined that IFJS protects an object from being seized,
but not from suit.189
Outside of the United States, the majority of museums are consid-
ered state entities, that receive “most or all of their funding from pub-
lic sources.”190  The U.S. courts have been inconsistent in their IFJS
classification of these state-funded museums;191 in Malewicz v. City of
Amsterdam, the District Court of D.C. determined that the Stedelijk
Museum, in Amsterdam, was a political subdivision.192  However, the
Ninth Circuit a few years later in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain,
treated the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum in Madrid as an agency of
the Kingdom of Spain.193  Nevertheless, a majority of the cases liti-
gated under IFJS classify foreign-state-funded museums as agencies
186. Id.
187. Stephen J. Knerly, Jr. & Kristen L. Gest, International Loans State Immunity and Anti-
seizure Laws, A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9–10 (2009).  There is no official application form; rather, the
applicant must instead write a letter to the State Department.
188. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 13, Leonard
Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 517 F. Supp. 2d 322 (2007) [hereinafter “Brief for the U.S.”]
appeal dismissed by 2008 WL 2223219 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 2008), No. 07-5247 (Jan. 28, 2008).
189. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 311–12 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
190. PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW – CASES AND
MATERIALS 221 (3d ed. 2012).
191. See, e.g., Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining
that a Madrid museum was an agency of the Kingdom of Spain); Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam
(Malewicz II), 517 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328 (D.D.C. 2007) (hearing on appeal, the court determined
that an Amsterdam museum was a political subdivision).
192. Malewicz II, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
193. Cassirer, 616 F.3d at 1021.
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and instrumentalities for the purposes of FSIA.194  IFJS is a perfect
parallel statute to FSIA for the purpose of examining due process pro-
tections afforded to foreign sovereign agencies and instrumentalities.
III. ANALYSIS
Foreign state agencies and instrumentalities should be afforded the
constitutional due process protections currently available to both for-
eign and domestic corporations.  The first Section analyzes how, in
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court of the United States defined corpo-
rate personhood in a domestic context.195  The second Section applies
the judicial precedent concerning foreign sovereign agencies and in-
strumentalities, explored in the background, to the Hobby Lobby
analysis and characterization of corporations.196  The final Section
compares the framework through which agencies and instrumentali-
ties of a foreign sovereign are afforded due process protections with
the IFJS framework in order to explain why the FSIA should afford
the same due process protections.197
A. Hobby Lobby, Inc. & Corporate Personhood
The FSIA definition of agencies and instrumentalities consists of
corporations, and other bodies.198  The question of whether foreign
agencies and instrumentalities are entitled to due process protections
rests primarily upon whether they are classified as “persons” accord-
ing to the Constitution.  The constitutional framework analysis that
the Hobby Lobby court applied to a corporation can be employed
when considering the constitutional rights of a foreign-sovereign-
owned corporation or agency.199  The issue in Hobby Lobby was
whether the RFRA permitted HHS to require closely held corpora-
tions, pursuant to HHS’ rulemaking authority under the ACA, to pro-
vide employee health insurance coverage for contraception, for which
the use of such contraceptives violated the corporate owners’ genu-
194. See, e.g., Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that the FSIA immunity against attachment is grounded in the common law principle
that a foreign state’s property in the United States is presumed immune from attachment); Cas-
sirer, 616 F.3d at 1022 (holding that FSIA does not require the foreign state against whom the
action is filed to be the entity that took the property in question); Altmann v. Rep. of Austria,
142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1204 (2001) (holding that the museum’s change in structure does not
remove the court’s subject matter jurisdiction because the events at the center of the suit oc-
curred before the change in structure).
195. See infra notes 198–221 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 222–54 and accompanying text.
197. See infra notes 255–317 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
199. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
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inely held religious beliefs.200  The Supreme Court held that when ap-
plied to closely held corporations, the ACA regulations that imposed
the contraceptive mandate violated the RFRA.201  The Court, with
the support of the Dictionary Act, found that the RFRA applies
“equally to for-profit corporations” as it does to natural persons.202
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, reasoned that furthering the
religious freedom of corporations “also furthers individual religious
freedom.”203  In this way, the Supreme Court equated for-profit cor-
porations with “personhood” in a constitutional analysis of religious
freedom, and thus strengthened the argument that corporations are
“persons” and may thus be eligible for due process protection, at least
as far as domestic corporations are concerned.
The Court used expropriation of property as an example of the indi-
vidual human nature of corporations.204  It was a direct attempt to
draw a parallel between the Due Process Clause and the rights af-
forded to corporations if they are considered “persons.”205  The
Hobby Lobby decision certainly changed the discourse about the role
of corporations in society by piercing through the maxim that corpora-
tions are persons solely because they are recognized as legal entities.
Instead, the Supreme Court looked to the human factor inherent in a
corporation as possible justification for such an adage.206  Justice Alito
noted, somewhat facetiously, that “[c]orporations, ‘separate and apart
from’ the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them,
cannot do anything at all.”207
While Hobby Lobby involved a domestic corporation, the funda-
mental organization of corporations means that it should, neverthe-
less, be applicable to international corporations when they seek
litigation in United States courts.  In part, such an enlargement of
200. Id. at 2754.  The ACA requires certain employers’ group health plans to provide “preven-
tive care and screenings” for women without any “cost sharing requirements.” Id. at 2762 (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13 (a)(4) (2012)).
201. Id. at 2785; see 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (defining “person” and “whoever” as including corpo-
rations, associations, firms, companies, partnerships, societies, and individuals).
202. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
203. Id. (quoting Corps. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
204. Id. at 2768.
205. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.  The Constitution provides that “no person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Id.
206. Sandeep Gopalan & Akshaya Kamalnath, Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility as
a Vehicle for Reducing Inequality: An Indian Solution for Piketty and the Millennials, 10 NW. J. L.
& SOC. POL’Y 34, 41 (2015).
207. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of
the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 724 F.3d 277, 385 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d by Hobby
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768).
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Hobby Lobby’s scope is natural because judicial decisions in the
United States hinge upon precedent, and all corporations should be
treated equally by U.S. courts to ensure uniformity.208  More impor-
tantly, the Court left the holding in Hobby Lobby open-ended and
expansive, providing corporations with the potential to justify a right
to privacy against regulatory scrutiny, or even claim the Second
Amendment right to bear arms.209  Justice Alito stated in the decision
that “the purpose of extending rights to corporations is to protect the
rights of people associated with the corporation, including sharehold-
ers, officers, and employees.”210  Just as these shareholders and of-
ficers are shielded from liability by the corporate legal organization of
their business, so too do foreign-sovereign-owned agencies and instru-
mentalities enjoy “the shield of separate corporate status” from their
sovereign as well as presumptive immunity from suit.211  While inter-
national foreign-sovereign-owned corporations may look like a beast
with another name, they are quite similar to domestic corporations, to
the point where pivotal judicial decisions like Hobby Lobby will affect
foreign corporations as much as domestic ones.  Both domestic and
international corporations must follow the laws of incorporation in
their country of origin, function under similar rules, and are organized
with the same structure.212
The Hobby Lobby decision was meant to apply narrowly and to be
limited to only close, publicly held corporations.213  This is because in
coming to their conclusion on the right of closely held corporations to
freedom of religion, the Court was forced to redefine, or at least es-
tablish, a more comprehensive definition of corporate personhood,
namely that “[a] corporation is simply a form of organization used by
208. Precedent, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/
precident.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2016).
209. Applebaum, supra note 161.
210. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2755.
211. Riblett, supra note 55, at 3.  Due to this “dual protection,” Riblett proposed that the term
“agencies and instrumentalities” should be removed from FSIA definition of a foreign state and
should not be entitled to immunity, but still retain their legal separateness. Id. at 3–4.
212. Adam Dowdney, Corporate Governance in the UK and U.S. Comparison, METRO. CORP.
COUNSEL (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/6173/corporate-governance-
uk-and-us-comparison.  There has been a “measure of convergence” in corporate governance
internationally, because of the standards required by international investors and capital markets,
in addition to initiatives by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development to provide a framework for corporate governance. Id.
213. CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43654, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION BY
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. 3
(2015) (noting that the Court’s determination that RFRA extends to for-profit corporations is
bound to have untoward effects); see Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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human beings to achieve desired ends.”214  Under the law of non-con-
tradiction, one of the three classical laws of thought, the terms  “cor-
poration” or “corporate personhood” cannot have different meanings
when applied to publicly held, for-profit corporations, closely held
corporations, and not-for-profit corporations.215
In addition, the majority’s explanation of the Dictionary Act’s defi-
nition of “person” as indistinguishable between different types of cor-
porations according to the company’s value, which also suggests that it
may not differentiate between types of corporations according to
other criteria (e.g., size or public trading status), supports the exten-
sion of the Court’s narrow holding.216  Ultimately, then, Hobby Lobby
has destroyed the legal fiction of “corporate personhood,” and instead
relegated a corporation to a sum of its parts, or a legal construction
that can be overcome.217  The Supreme Court shattered the long-
standing legal fiction of what defines a corporation.218  If the legal un-
derstanding of a corporation, namely that the corporation is merely
the sum of the people controlling it, then a foreign-sovereign-owned
agency or instrumentality does not automatically point to being a ser-
vant to the state itself, but may instead be a corporation in its own
right.  This would mean that instead of the agency or instrumentality
being associated with the foreign state, the ownership is so limited or
so distinct from policy that it is a corporation first, and foreign state
entity second.  Ultimately, the classification will turn on the amount of
control exerted by a foreign state over an agency or instrumentality,
and whether this control, or lack of it, grants those foreign state-
owned agencies or instrumentalities the right to due process protec-
tion.  In sum, Hobby Lobby changed the conversation regarding per-
sonhood for non-natural persons, and held that corporations are part
of the traditional legal understanding of “person.”219  This conclusion
supports the rationale for giving due process protections to corpora-
214. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–70.
215. Patrick Wiseman, Ethical Jurisprudence, 40 LOY. L. REV. 281, 297 (1994).  The law of
non-contradiction states that contradictory statements cannot both be true in the same sense at
the same time (not both P and not-P). Id.  Aristotle’s Metaphysics is traditionally seen as the
source of this law. Id. at 298.  As Aristotle stated, “the same attribute cannot at the same time
belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect.” Id. (quoting ARTISTOTLE’S
METAPHYSICS, BOOK IV, Ch. 4, 1005b19-21 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 1979)).
216. Brown, supra note 213, at 3.
217. See Ungar, supra note 153 (“A corporation now not only enjoys many of the same pro-
tections as a person under our law but is crafted to remove obligations a person would ordinarily
have but for the shield of the corporate entity such as personal liability for a corporation’s bad
behavior.”).
218. Id.
219. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69.
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tions, including the agencies and instrumentalities of foreign sover-
eigns because historically courts have held that only natural persons
have the right to due process.220  The connection that sovereign-
owned agencies and instrumentalities have to be sovereign is the final
causal link between foreign-owned corporations and due process
protections.
B. Sovereign Control Over an Agency or Instrumentality
The distinction between natural and artificial persons is similar to
the difference between a sovereign-owned agency or instrumentality
and corporation; at least so far as it is defined by Hobby Lobby—they
are both at their center abstract concepts with the rights of citizens.  In
the case of Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,221 the Supreme
Court noted that that when one of the enumerated exceptions to im-
munity in FSIA is applied, “the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.”222  It is unclear, however, whether the term  “private
individual” in FSIA was meant to refer to  a private individual that is
an American citizen and their corresponding rights, or a foreign indi-
vidual, who holds significantly fewer rights to access the U.S. judicial
system.223  Just over twenty years later, Hobby Lobby provided a new
definition of a corporation and its rights, seemingly providing corpora-
tions with the same right to constitutional protections as “natural”
persons.224  Part of the debate about whether corporations have the
right to due process protections draws on the distinction between
“natural” and “artificial” personhood, of which the corporation is cer-
tainly the latter.225  This academic distinction is blurred beyond recog-
nition now that corporations are recognized as being merely the sum
of their parts.226
220. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 85–6 (2002)
(determining that Libya, as a foreign state, was not a “person” as defined by the Due Process
Clause).
221. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
222. Id. at 488–89 (1983) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012)).
223. United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271, 274–75 (1990) (finding that aliens
receive Constitutional protections only when they have substantial connections with the United
States); see RICHARD H. FALLON, THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 250 (2004) (explaining that non-citizens in the United States for not
receive the same rights as American citizens).
224. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
225. “Liberty,” Justia, http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-14/06-definitions.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
226. See Ungar, supra note 153.
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In TMR, the D.C. Circuit court formulated the sovereign-control
test, which determined whether the veil of an agency or instrumental-
ity should be pierced,227 and employed a case-by-case analysis of
whether the State exerted sufficient control over the entity to make it
an agent of the State, at which point there would be “no reason to
extend . . . a constitutional right that is denied to the sovereign it-
self.”228  This test can still stand as functional in light Hobby Lobby
because the amount of control that a foreign state exerts is integral in
determining whether the agency or instrumentality is a legal entity in
its own right, without its connection to the state to give it legiti-
macy.229  An observer can rightly assume that a corporation is merely
another branch of government when its close connection with the sov-
ereign has been functionally subsumed under the sovereign as merely
another branch of the government.  On the other hand, if the corpora-
tion has limited contacts with the state, and is controlled to a lesser
extent, it can be assumed to be a corporation first, and a state entity
second.  In Hobby Lobby, protecting the corporate right to freedom
of religion thus protects the religious liberty of the humans who own
and control the corporations.230  Hobby Lobby, as a closely held cor-
poration, the owners of which control its board of directors and hold
all of its voting shares,231 can be juxtaposed with corporations like
TMR Energy, which is so extensively controlled by  the State of
Ukraine that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the corpo-
ration  was “not a juridical entity distinct from the State itself.”232  Not
only would that circumstance line up with current jurisprudence, but
the entity would then fall neatly within the category of foreign corpo-
ration, for which there is evidence of due process rights, although pri-
227. TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301–02 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
The Circuit Court relied upon the agency analysis in Bancec and Foremost-McKesson to deter-
mine that the State of Ukraine had plenary control over the State Property Fund. Id. at 301.
The court reasoned that SPF’s chairman is appointed by the President of Ukraine subject to the
consent of the Supreme Rada, and SPF’s expenses are paid from the budget of the State of
Ukraine.  The court found that SPF is an agent of the State, “barely distinguishable from an
executive department of the government.” Id.
228. Id. at 301.  The test has been followed most recently in a similar situation in GSS Group
Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Authority. 774 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138–39 (D.D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that Fifth
Amendment rights are only precluded from an agency or instrumentality when it is “legally
indistinguishable” from the foreign sovereign).  Once again, as in TMR, the D.C. Circuit Court is
the only court to continually apply this rule; it is not yet recognized in the rest of the country.
Foreign corporations, however, have only been given the right to due process protections to
challenge the exercise of personal jurisdiction, which is generally granted automatically through
FSIA. GSS Group Ltd., 680 F.3d at 813.
229. TMR, 411 F.3d at 301.
230. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62, 2768 (2014).
231. Id. at 2774–75.
232. TMR, 411 F.3d at 305.
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marily related to personal jurisdiction, being provided by U.S.
courts.233  In TMR, the court noted that the Chairman of the State
Property Fund, the agency at issue, is appointed and discharged by the
President of Ukraine, and that the members of its board must be ap-
proved by the Presidium of the Supreme Rada.234
The D.C. Circuit court held that an instrumentality should be
treated as a state, (i.e., lacking the protections of the Due Process
Clause), at least when it has acted as the agent of its  parent state, or
where fraud or injustice would result from treating the agency or in-
strumentality as separate from the state.235  Dr. Strong, a law profes-
sor who has handled complex international commercial disputes as
both an attorney and arbitrator236 has described the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning as “circular” and asserted that “it will always result in the
agency or instrumentality not receiving any due process protec-
tions.”237  She further explains that an agency or instrumentality is not
covered by FSIA unless there is a relationship of principal and agent
created by the sovereign exerting the requisite amount of control;238
however, following the reasoning of the D.C. Court, if such a relation-
ship between the sovereign and instrumentality does exist, the entity
“can be equated with the state and the U.S. court need not extend any
due process rights to the agency or instrumentality under the U.S.
Constitution.”239  This is certainly the problem with the current frame-
work, but considering Hobby Lobby’s characterization of corpora-
tions, the foreign state-owned agency or instrumentality can be
regarded as any other foreign corporation with access to due process
protections.240  The Court characterized corporations as nothing more
233. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2785 (2011) (holding that a
foreign manufacturer did not have sufficient minimum contacts with a state as to establish juris-
diction); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that a Japanese
manufacturer lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the state of California to establish juris-
diction over it); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (holding that a Columbian manufacturer
did not have sufficient contacts with Texas a to subject it to a Texas court’s jurisdiction).
234. TMR, 411 F.3d at 302.
235. George K. Foster, Collecting From Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforc-
ing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some
Proposals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 695 (2008).
236. S.I. Strong, Ph.D., Faculty Profile, MISSOURI SCH. OF LAW, http://law.missouri.edu/about/
people/strong/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2016).
237. Foster, supra note 235, at 696 n.145 (quoting S.I. Strong, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Against Foreign States or State Agencies, 26 N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 335, 345–46 (2006)).
238. Id. at 345–46.
239. Foster, supra note 235, at 696 n.145 (quoting Strong, supra note 237, at 346).
240. There may be an issue of the agency or instrumentality otherwise being immune from
suit if they are no longer classified as a party with a connection to a foreign sovereign.
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than the sum of their parts—merely people with individual rights.241
The Supreme Court reasoned that the individuals should not lose their
constitutional rights and protections just because they are organized
into a corporation.242
Naturally, there is a counter-argument that the individual owners of
the Hobby Lobby corporation are  U.S. citizens, as opposed to people
from outside of the United States who are organized into a corpora-
tion.243  In Wang Zong Xiao v. Reno,244 the District Court for the
Northern District of California reasoned that the plaintiff did not
“seek admission to the United States; he requested no ‘privilege,’ and
his claim infringers no ‘sovereign prerogative,’” so there was no limi-
tation upon the alien’s rights to bring constitutional due process
claims.245  In addition, the court in Lynch v. Cannatella246 held that
“whatever due process rights excludable aliens may be denied by vir-
tue of their status, they are entitled under the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of gross physical
abuse at the hands of state or federal officials.”247  Indeed, “case law
grant[s] aliens other rights, such as the constitutional protections af-
forded all individuals against serious crimes.”248  The Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on this issue, and all case law thus far addresses only
one due process right, as opposed to making a holistic determination
on the due process rights of alien citizens.
Contemporary corporations are arguably just as powerful as state
entities, but neither has recourse to states-only groups like the Inter-
national Court of Justice.249  The court in Price reasoned that foreign
sovereigns do not need due process protections because they do not
require protection from the U.S. Government in the same way that
private U.S. citizens do.250  If sovereigns have disputes with each
other, they can bring their complaints to the International Court of
241. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
242. Id.
243. In 1990, the Supreme Court reasoned in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that an
alien’s request to suppress evidence seized during a search of respondent’s residence in Mexico
should be denied because respondent was a “resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to
the United States, was in the country involuntarily, and the place searched was in Mexico.”  494
U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).  The Court held that protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures did not extend to aliens outside the United States. Id.
244. 837 F. Supp. 1506 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
245. Id. at 1549.
246. 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
247. Id. at 1374.
248. Xiao, 837 F. Supp. at 1550.
249. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
250. Id. at 99–100.
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Justice, instead of U.S. courts.251  “The risk of dispute in international
business relations does not change if the foreign party is privately
owned or state-owned.”252  Given the fact that states can resolve their
disputes among each other through a dedicated tribunal, foreign state
agencies and instrumentalities should be afforded Constitutional due
process protections.253  Foreign state-owned museums, however, al-
ready have their own mechanism available to them in the United
States to allow them to receive at least some Constitutional due pro-
cess protections.  The Immunity From Judicial Seizure (IFJS) statute
is an excellent framework that gives due process rights to foreign sov-
ereign agencies and instrumentalities.  By providing these protections,
IFJS could not only strengthen the rights that museums have, but also
those of all agencies and instrumentalities.  For these reasons, IFJS
should be a model for how all agencies and instrumentalities should
be treated in U.S. litigation.
C. Museums as Foreign Agencies or Instrumentalities
There is no doubt that a corporation may not be deprived its prop-
erty without due process of law, as was recognized in 1931 in Russian
Volunteer Fleet v. U.S.254  There, the Supreme Court found that the
Fifth Amendment gives to “each owner of property” his “individual
right;” foreign corporations doing business are included within the
Court’s understanding of the Fifth Amendment.255  Moreover, the
Court noted that “alien friends are embraced within the terms of the
Fifth Amendment,” and therefore the constitutional provision that
private property cannot be taken without just compensation applies to
the Russian corporation suing in this case.256  As a result, within the
meaning of the Due Process Clauses, any act prohibiting the corpora-
tion’s ownership of property (or just compensation for the lack of
ownership) violated the Due Process Clause as applied to a foreign
corporation.257  A foreign corporation is now entitled to due process
protections as they relate to property.258  The question remains
whether this right is still valid when the foreign corporation is also
sovereign-owned.  State ownership of a foreign corporation or instru-
251. Id. at 100.
252. Vaughan, supra note 5, at 917.
253. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
254. 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (concerning the failure of the U.S. Government to pay just compen-
sation for ships which were built by a Russian corporation).
255. Id. at 491.
256. Id. at 492.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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mentality should not pose a barrier to the right to due process. In-
deed, IFJS already provides for just that.  IFJS provides immunity
from litigation to artwork owned by a sovereign agency and freedom
from a claim to seize the property when it is on display in the United
States.259
The corporation in Helicopteros was found to have had insufficient
contacts with the United States to sustain a suit in American courts in
part because the Helicopteros Corporation had no property or hold-
ings in the United States.260  In Daimler AG v. Bauman,261 a human
rights case implicating the Daimler corporation, the Supreme Court
found that general jurisdiction was not met because the case involved
“foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on foreign con-
duct,” so the corporation had no reasonable connection to the forum
state.262  Justice Ginsburg characterized Daimler’s business in the
State of California as so limited as to “hardly render it at home
there.”263  Following that same logic, when foreign agencies and in-
strumentalities do have property in the United States, they should be
granted the right to not have their property taken away without due
process of law.  In Price, the court noted that it is wholly impractical
to give due process protections to sovereigns, in part because “the
power of Congress and the President to freeze the assets of foreign
nations, or to impose economic sanctions on them, could be chal-
lenged as deprivations of property without due process of law,”264 as
well as judicial interference with political questions and the Presi-
dent’s executive power over international affairs.265
When it comes to agencies and instrumentalities, the issue of for-
eign policy should be of small concern and no impediment to due pro-
cess protection.  It would be futile to note all the sovereign-owned
agencies and instrumentalities not influenced by policy decisions—be-
cause that is an impossible task, but “control” is also not the test
courts exclusively envisioned in determining agency or instrumentality
status.266  The U.S. courts have attempted to create many tests to de-
termine both agency and instrumentality status and whether the cor-
259. 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012).
260. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 411–12 (1984).
261. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
262. Id. at 761–62, 764 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 760.
264. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
265. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2; see Toni Johnson, Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/congress-us-foreign-policy/
p29871 (explaining the role of Congress and the President in foreign relations).
266. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474 (2003) (“Only direct ownership of a ma-
jority of shares by the foreign state satisfies the statutory requirement” involving an entity “a
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porate veil should be pierced in litigation against one of these
corporations, all in an attempt to show legal separateness from the
sovereign.267  More simply, the “core function” test  in the case of
Transaero Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana,268 which finds an entity
to be an agency or instrumentality if the core function of the entity is
commercial in nature, should be sufficient to rebut any foreign policy
concerns.269  The essential purpose of the core function test is to de-
termine how closely a sovereign controls an agency or instrumentality.
If the core function of the agency or instrumentality is commercial,
then the chance that its actions will impact foreign policy is very low.
In addition to showing that courts follow different standards, not one
of these tests looks at the political factor at play, namely whether the
internal governmental policy has any impact upon the functioning and
decision making of the agency or instrumentality.270  Foreign policy
undoubtedly creeps into these agencies, but the commercial decisions
of state-owned corporations are, for the most part, market-focused, as
is the case with more traditional, non-state-owned counterparts.271
Most importantly, IFJS provides a framework to give foreign state-
owned agencies and instrumentalities due process protections.272  In
the case of foreign state-owned museums and cultural institutions,
which are examples of a sovereign agency or instrumentality, IFJS
prevents cultural objects on loan in the United States from being
seized or attached to a judgment.273  IFJS, therefore, codifies a due
process protection, the right to not have property expropriated with-
out due process of law as guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, and applies the clause exclusively to foreign state-
owned agencies or instrumentalities.274
In Altmann, an American woman sued for the return of paintings
that had belonged to her uncle and were stolen in Austria by the Nazis
during World War II.275  The paintings subsequently ended up in the
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2))); see also, Riblett, supra note 55, at 16.
267. Riblett, supra note 55, at 12–13, 16.  There is the “core functions” test, the “legal charac-
teristics” test, the Bancec presumption of separateness, and Dole Food’s direct majority-owner-
ship threshold. Id.
268. 30 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
269. Id. at 151.
270. Id.; see Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 474.
271. Riblett, supra note 55, at 23.
272. 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 680–81 (2004).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL106.txt unknown Seq: 35 10-APR-17 11:18
2016] DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FSIA 255
Belvedere Gallery (also known as the Austrian Gallery).276  It was un-
disputed that the Gallery is an agency or instrumentality of Austria
and that the property at issue was “owned” or “operated” by the Gal-
lery, as required by FSIA because the Gallery was an agency that had
“assumed control” over the property and used it for the benefit of the
foreign state.277  Under the so-called Bundesmuseen-Gesetz (BM-G)
law of 1988, the Gallery became an economically “autonomous,” not-
for-profit, scientific institution of public liability.  The Gallery’s assets,
however, continue to belong to the Republic of Austria.278  The law
dealt with the “legal standing, implementation, organization, and up-
keep of the Austrian Federal Museums (BM).”279  The Gallery, along
with eight other museum institutions, was “placed under the supervi-
sion of the Federal Minister of Education, Science, and Cultural Af-
fairs,” and is now subject to “yearly auditing by the Board of Trustees
. . . to ensure control for financial decisions,” as well as being required
to submit development, financing, and budget plans for four years
ahead.280  In addition, the Ministry appointed two of the nine mem-
bers of the Board of Trustees.281
The oversight from the Austrian government’s Board of Trustees is
understandable given that over half of the Gallery’s 7.2 million euro
budget comes from the Ministry.282  Nonetheless, the Gallery main-
tains in-house financial, curatorial, and management autonomy.283
Ultimately, this new law transitioned the Gallery and other cultural
institutions from being primarily state-run to independently run.284
Despite TMR, which focused on whether an agency relationship ex-
isted between the entity and the state, the court ultimately considered
the Gallery’s level of autonomy from the republic of Austria sufficient
276. Id.
277. Appellee’s Opposition Brief on Expedited Trial at 28–29, Republic of Austria v. Alt-
mann, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-56003), 2000 WL 33980184, at *28–29 (quoting
Vencedora Oceanica Navigation, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationals Algerienne de Navigacion, 730
F.2d 195, 204 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).
278. HADWIG KRAEUTLER, INTERCOM CONFERENCE LEADERSHIP IN MUSEUMS, MANAG-
ING MUSEUM WORK IN AUSTRIA 3 (2002).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. The Board of Trustees oversees all nine museums and consists of a member from the
Federal Chancellery, the Minister of Economic Affairs, an external scientific research institution
related to the museum, the Friend of the Museum organization, the museum-personnel union,
and the central organization of the trade union Public Services. Id.
282. Kraeutler, supra note 278, at 4.
283. Id. at 4.
284. EMMA BENTZ & MARLIES RAFFLER, NAT’L MUSEUMS IN AUSTRIA, CONFERENCE ON
BUILDING NAT’L MUSEUMS IN EUROPE 1750–2010, EUNAMUS REPORT NO. 1, 21, 34 (Peter
Aronsson & Gabriella Elgenius eds. 2011).
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to meet the requirements of agency status.285 TMR based its determi-
nation of whether an entity was a “person” on how much control the
sovereign exercised over the agency.286  If the TMR test were to be
applied to the Belvedere Gallery, the Gallery would likely be found to
be a legal “person” because it is considered to be independent from
the Republic of Austria.287  The issue of independence of the agency
from the sovereign, however, is of little issue in the IFJS.
IFJS states that immunity applies to any “temporary exhibition or
display thereof,” in which a “work of art or object of cultural signifi-
cance is imported into the United States from any foreign country,”
involving cooperation between “the foreign owner or custodian” and
“the United States or one or more cultural or educational institu-
tions,” and has received permission from the State Department.288
The owner of the work of art, or the lending institution is only re-
quired to be a foreign “owner” or “custodian,” which is a relatively
low bar.289  The owner could be a private collector, foreign corpora-
tion, or a state-owned museum, but the result is the same: owners are
all assessed for immunity protection equally.290  IFJS places private
and public foreign parties on equal footing and allows for public par-
ties, also known as agencies or instrumentalities, to have the same
property protection as that afforded to private parties.291  This is a
perfect example of how the distinction between private corporations
and foreign state-owned agencies and instrumentalities has been
eroded and how both are treated the same, for the purposes of Fifth
Amendment due process protection, from having their property
seized by the U.S. government.292
While the Due Process Clause is intended to prevent the govern-
ment from abusing its power or employing its authority as an instru-
ment of oppression,293 there is no reason why that protection should
285. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2002).
286. TMR Energy Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
287. BENTZ & RAFFLER, supra note 284, at 34.
288. 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. In Malewicz, the court only mentioned “the foreign owner of works of art” but failed to
put any limiting characteristic on that owner regarding whether it must be a public or private
entity. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 305 (D.D. Cir. 2005).  Further, the
owner requesting immunity is required to submit a pre-written statement with the application,
which refers to the owner only as “the applicant.”  Jennifer M. Shield, Curator Congress: How
Proposed Legislation Adds Protection to Cultural Object Loans from Foreign States, 23 DEPAUL
J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 427, 441 (2013) (quoting Application Procedure & Checklist,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/1/3196.htm (last updated May 2016)).
292. U.S. CONST. art. V.
293. DELLAPENNA, supra note 36, at 183.
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not be extended to foreign parties doing business in and subjecting
themselves to the laws of the United States on a daily basis.294  In
addition to the reasons that the courts above have already elucidated
for denying due process to foreign countries, it should be noted that
foreign sovereigns in their public capacity have very little impact upon
American society.295  In contrast, the private acts of a foreign sover-
eign, for which United States law extends no immunity, have become
more sophisticated, and the foreign-sovereign-state structures its com-
mercial operations through legally separate entities.296  These private
commercial acts enjoy financial success in the United States, one of
the largest economies in the world.297  The benefits of “corporate sep-
arateness” have historically been applied to traditional companies and
individuals seeking to protect themselves from liability, but state-
owned agencies and instrumentalities are no different in their struc-
ture, pursuit of investment and commerce, and a growth in the world’s
economy.298
In GSS Group, the district court determined that a corporation op-
erating separately from its sovereign “is not the ‘juridical equal’ of the
United States” and is entitled to due process protections.299  Such a
corporation has “no diplomatic presence or political authority with
which to engage the United States and defends its rights.”300  While
the expropriation exception of FSIA is limited in its applicability only
294. Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident
Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2006); see, e.g., Edward B. Adams, Jr.,
Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Parties, in INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND
SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 113, 114 (David J. Levy ed., 2003) (noting
that the same standards apply for “personal jurisdiction over a non-resident or foreign defen-
dant”).  Karen Halverson, Is a Foreign State a “Person”? Does it Matter?: Personal Jurisdiction,
Due Process, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 115,
135–36 (2001) (stating that under “the ‘minimum contacts’ test . . . it is well settled that foreign
corporations are entitled to due process” but noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has not “ex-
plicitly address[ed] the threshold question of whether a foreign corporation is entitled to due
process.”).
295. The extent of scholarship regarding a foreign sovereigns’ public acts influencing the
United States is limited to the enforcement of foreign arbitral judgment and the potential for
recognizing moral rights from civil law countries. See Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-
Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1978, 2009 (1994); Richard S. Markovits, Learning From the Foreigners: A Response to Justice
Scalia’s and Professor Levinson’s Professional Moral Parochialism, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J.  367, 379
(2004); Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 783, 785–86 (2004).
296. Riblett, supra note 55, at 18.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. GSS Group Ltd v. Nat’l Port Auth., 774 F. Supp. 2d 134, 140–41 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
300. Id. at 140.
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to foreign states, or more typically agencies and instrumentalities,
IFJS applies to all foreign entities.301  When analyzed concurrently,
both the agencies and instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns and all
other foreign parties, save for the states themselves, are given the
same due process protection from seizure of their assets.302
“The guarantee of due process for all citizens requires the govern-
ment to respect all rights, guarantees, and protections afforded by the
U.S. Constitution and resultant statutes prior to the deprivation of
life, liberty, or property.”303  “Due process guarantees that a party will
receive a fundamentally fair, orderly, and just judicial proceeding.”304
The goal of procedural due process, with which both FSIA and IFJS
are concerned, is to ensure fundamental fairness by guaranteeing a
party the right to be heard, proper notification of an imminent trial
and standardized procedures throughout the trial, and ensure that the
attendant court has the proper jurisdiction to render a judgment.305
By all accounts, these purposes and provisions of the Due Process
Clause match the spirit and function of IFJS.306  Due process “is not
an end in itself”; rather, “[i]ts constitutional purpose is to protect a
substantive interest to which an individual has a legitimate claim of
entitlement.”307  Foreign museums have a substantive interest in their
art and archaeological objects.308
IFJS protects foreign-owned art and archaeological objects from
“seizure or other judicial process”309 for the “purpose or having the
effect of depriving such [U.S. cultural] institution . . . of custody or
control of such object.”310  In other words, a litigant may not ask the
federal government to seize sovereign’s (or agency or instrumental-
301. Shield, supra note 291, at 433; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).  The “expropriation
exception” requires that the defendant owns the property in question, and is engaged in com-
mercial activity in the United States, and that the property has been expropriated in violation of
international law. Id. at 433–44.
302. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
303. Fifth Amendment, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fifth_amend
ment (last visited Aug. 13, 2016).
304. Id.
305. Id.; see Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 420 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
306. See Brief for the United States, supra note 188.
307. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983); Hill v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 163, 171 (4th Cir.
1995).
308. Sue Choi, The Legal Landscape of the International Art Market After Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 180 (2005).
309. WOUDENBERG, supra note 174, at 154 (quoting Immunity from Judicial Seizure Applica-
tions – Cultural Objects, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3432.htm (last visited
Nov. 28 2015)).
310. Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298, 311 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (alteration in
original) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2012)).
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ity’s) property physically located in the United States, nor may he also
“serve the receiving [U.S.] museum with judicial process” resulting in
the interference with the physical custody or control of the
artworks.311  In Malewicz, the court held that “Immunity from seizure
is not immunity from suit for a declaration of rights or for damages
arising from an alleged conversion if the other terms of FSIA jurisdic-
tion exist.”312  The court noted that the Malewicz heirs were not seek-
ing seizure of the artworks, but rather were seeking to establish their
rights in the art through the judicial process provided by FSIA.313  Ac-
cording to the principles of FSIA, IFJS prevented foreign property
from being taken without due process of law, with the process of law
occurring when Malewicz sued the Stedelijk Museum, an agency or
instrumentality controlled by the City of Amsterdam.  As a result,
IFJS provided Fifth Amendment Constitutional due process protec-
tions to a foreign state-owned agency or instrumentality.
This Section demonstrates how the 2014 Supreme Court case of
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., has changed the analysis regard-
ing corporations and personhood for the purposes of Constitutional
protections.314  The Court’s reasoning can be applied to foreign corpo-
rations, including sovereign-owned agencies and instrumentalities in
order to guarantee due process protections for these alien bodies.315
Finally, the IFJS statute prevents foreign property, expressed as art
and cultural objects, to be taken from foreign sovereign agencies and
311. Id.
312. Id. at 312 (when the presence of property in the United States fulfilled one of the re-
quirements for FSIA jurisdiction; that the contested property be “present” in the Unites States
at the time of suit).
313. Id. (citing Magness v. Russian Fed’n, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1358–59 (S.D. Ala. 2000)).
FSIA allows suits against foreign states over “rights in property taken in violation of interna-
tional law.” Id. at 313 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012). Malewicz is
significant because it raises the problem of a “conflict between FSIA and IFJS and the status of
loans of art works to United States institutions” when there is a claim that the works are stolen
property. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 190, at 753.  To solve this apparent problem, the Foreign
Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act “was introduced to amend FSIA so
that the presence of art works and cultural objects in the United States with immunity from
seizure would not be regarded as commercial activity” for the purposes of FSIA. Id.  Such a bill
would reverse the holding in Malewicz and make it impossible for a plaintiff to be awarded “a
monetary award from a foreign sovereign for the theft of a cultural object.” Id. This bill was
first introduced in 2012, and it passed in the House of Representatives several times, but could
not pass in the Senate in 2014, and is now effectively dead. H.R. 4292 (113th): Foreign Cultural
Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/con
gress/bills/113/hr4292 (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
314. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
315. Supra notes 132–57 and accompanying text.
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instrumentalities such as state museums, without Constitutional due
process.316
IV. IMPACT
Foreign sovereign agencies and instrumentalities should be granted
due process protections under the FSIA, as they are under IFJS.  This
Part examines the impact of this procedure, including the amendment
of the FSIA and the policy-based consequences. “The essence of due
process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss
[be given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet
it.’”317  Currently, there are many judicial tests between the Circuit
Courts of Appeal to determine whether an entity is an agency or in-
strumentality, whether it is controlled by the state, and ultimately
whether the entity should have the right to constitutional due process
protections.318  The existence of multiple tests means that every court
applies its own standard, and there is no consistency in the law.  This
inconsistency is unacceptable in a legal system that relies upon an ex-
tensive use of precedent.319  There needs to be an easily applied rule
regarding due process for agencies and instrumentalities.  In Heller v.
Doe,320 the Supreme Court commented that the purpose of “legal pro-
cess,” according to the Constitution, is to “minimize the risk of erro-
neous decisions.”321  The Court advocated for the courts to remain
“flexible” in applying the due process doctrine because it is so fact
specific and must apply to a “broad spectrum of concerns.”322
In rejecting absolute rules regarding due process, the Supreme
Court advocated for a test balancing three considerations:
First the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally the Government’s in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra-
316. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
317. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (alteration in original) (quoting Joint
Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
318. Supra notes 78–174 and accompanying text.
319. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411,
465–66 (2010).
320. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
321. Id. at 332 (1993) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex,
442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)).
322. Id.
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tive burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.323
These factors must be taken into account in determining the impact
that giving due process rights to foreign-sovereign owned agencies and
instrumentalities will have upon the parties and the U.S. judicial sys-
tem.324  An amendment to FSIA is necessary—one which not only ex-
plicitly permits due process protections for agencies and
instrumentalities, but also denies subject matter jurisdiction where
there is no connection to the United States.325  The problem would
not be solved, but another one would be created, if the subsidiaries of
sovereign agencies and instrumentalities met the requirements of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under FSIA despite the claim arising from bus-
iness transacted outside of the United States.326
One way forward that has been consistently called for is an amend-
ment to FSIA, requiring a personal jurisdiction analysis for state-
owned corporations that behave on the international stage as indepen-
dent juridical entities, essentially treating agencies and instrumentali-
ties in the same manner as private, foreign corporations.327  The most
significant problem with this “solution,” however, is that once again
the judiciary would be faced with a rule that requires ambiguous line-
drawing to determine the threshold independence must surpass so as
to accommodate the Due Process Clause.328  Despite this procedural
challenge, an amendment to FSIA is necessary to recognize, in the
judicial system, the effects of globalization and the increased presence
of state-owned agencies and instrumentalities in global commerce.
The Second Circuit, at least, has focused less on the FSIA and more
on the U.S. Constitution itself.329
From a policy perspective, if an agency or instrumentality is indis-
tinguishable from a private corporation it should be treated like a cor-
poration, and it should receive the requisite due process protections.
This approach ensures that courts apply terms and definitions uni-
formly and aids courts in breaking down organizations into their com-
ponent parts when forced to engage in line-drawing.  Practically,
323. Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Office of Educ., 303 P.3d 1140, 1150 (2013) (quoting
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
324. Id. at 1150.
325. Andrew Lowenstein, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act & Corporate Subsidies of
Agencies or Instrumentalities of Foreign States, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 350, 374 (2001).
326. Id. at 375.
327. Vaughan, supra note 5, at 948–49.
328. See TMR Energy Ltd. V. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 411 F.3d 296, 301–02 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing and applying the “sufficient control test”).
329. Strong, supra note 237, at 354.
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giving the agencies and instrumentalities due process protections
should not necessarily involve much change in procedure.  Already
codified in FSIA are different procedural provisions regarding service
of process upon a foreign state versus an agency or instrumentality.330
The provisions are a recognition that delivering notice solely through
diplomatic means is insufficient and impractical for agencies and in-
strumentalities, especially those with sufficient commercial activity in
the United States to justify maintaining offices in the country.  While
courts are always concerned about possibly opening the floodgates of
litigation, a highly relevant consideration where jurisdiction is con-
cerned, the opposite is likely to happen here.  Indeed, if instrumentali-
ties are “persons,” they can challenge a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction, which is presumed to exist under FSIA, because sover-
eigns are not “persons.”331  The courts and plaintiffs would have to
prove that personal jurisdiction exists by satisfying the minimum con-
tacts test of International Shoe.
Professor Strong notes, the United States is “exceedingly anxious”
to grant itself jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns even though it is
doubtful that the United States would allow itself, or its agencies or
instrumentalities to be subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign courts
under similar circumstances.332  In the end, the effect of this change to
FSIA’s application to international law is of little consequence be-
cause U.S. courts focus most, if not all, of their analysis upon the
framework of domestic law.333
V. CONCLUSION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is an expansive statute that
has left many courts struggling to apply the provisions in a consistent
manner.  Unlike foreign states, foreign-sovereign-owned agencies and
instrumentalities should have the right to Constitutional due process
protections when they are subject to litigation in United States courts.
330. See supra notes 36–77 and accompanying text.
331. Gosia Spangenberg, The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Some Foreign State In-
strumentalities Must Be Consistent with Due Process, 81 WASH. L. REV. 447, 448, 455 (2006).
332. Strong, supra note 237, at 354.  “In 2005, the United States withdrew from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes,” which “provides for jurisdiction in the International Court of Justice.”
John Quigley, The United States’ Withdrawal From International Court of Justice Jurisdiction in
Consular Cases: Reasons and Consequences, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 263 (2009).  This
“withdrawal raised questions in the international community about the United States’ intent to
comply with its obligations under the VCCR.” Id.  Many view the United States’ action as a
“significant reversal of U.S. policy regarding U.S. participation in international dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms.” Id. at 263–64.
333. Strong, supra note 237, at 354.
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Despite a lack of consensus among the judiciary, the Immunity from
Judicial Seizure statute is a comparable statute that acts as precedent
to giving agencies and instrumentalities due process protections in
court.  Therefore, it is not a stretch of judicial doctrine to grant due
process under FSIA because it is already available under IFJS.  More-
over, private foreign corporations are granted due process rights.  The
right to Due Process already exists under IFJS, and sovereign-owned
corporations are not substantially different than private corporations,
so there is no reason why agencies and instrumentalities should be
granted the right to due process in one context but denied that same
right in another.
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